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I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid growth in the international financial system has created
unprecedented opportunity and complexity for investors, as well as
challenges for capital markets regulators. The popularity of pooled
investment vehicles such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture
capital funds, has helped to fuel this growth. Industry expansion has in turn
necessitated the reexamination of the appropriate capital markets regulatory
structure. In particular, hedge fund regulation has been at the forefront of
the debate because hedge funds deeply impact market liquidity and the
potential for heightened systemic risk, due to the leverage they typically
use. While mandatory registration is no longer a likely prospect in the near
future, an examination of the current disclosure rules, in tandem with an
analysis of the concerns raised by the growth of hedge funds, can build a
better understanding of the correct regulatory approach moving forward.
This Article will provide an overview of the basics of the hedge fund
industry, summarize the securities laws applicable to hedge funds, examine
how disclosure requirements interact with the hedge fund industry, review
common concerns with hedge funds, and assess the current regulatory
approach to hedge funds both in the United States and abroad.
Additionally, this paper will evaluate how changes to the current securities
rules that affect hedge funds could impact the industry's future.
II. HEDGE FUND OVERVIEW
The term "hedge fund" does not have a single accepted definition
although it is generally understood to be an unregistered pooled investment
vehicle that invests in a broad range of securities, with a fee structure that
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typically compensates the fund advisor based upon a combination of assets
under management and a percent of capital appreciation.1 The General
Accounting Office differentiates hedge funds from other investment
vehicles by citing the capability of hedge fund managers to: (1) invest in
any type of asset in the market; (2) use many investment strategies at the
same time; (3) switch investment strategies quickly; and (4) borrow money
and/or otherwise use leverage without being subject to investment company
leverage limits.2
While not all funds will meet each of these criteria, depending on their
particular investment mandate, the description helps differentiate a typical
hedge fund from a vehicle such as a mutual fund, which is regulated and
faces much tighter restrictions on its possible investments.3
In general, a hedge involves taking a position in one security and an
offsetting position in another security, such as buying a stock and a put on
that stock at the same time, which will allow investors to benefit from
upward movement of the stock, but will also give investors the right to sell
the stock at a specified exercise price if it experiences a decline. Using
derivative instruments to take hedged positions allows investors ideally to
limit their downside risk while making a directional bet that a security will
move up or down, or even simply experience volatility.4 Myriad strategies
fall under the hedge fund designation. Hedge Fund Research, Inc.
assembles one of the largest industry databases tracking nineteen separate
strategies including, among others, event driven, distressed securities,
convertible arbitrage.5
1. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE COMMISSION'S DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION viii (2003) [hereinafter SEC 2003 STAFF REPORT] (explaining that other
unregistered pooled investment vehicles include venture capital and private equity funds,
which typically have different fee structures and rarely invest in public securities).
2. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
REGULATORS NEED TO FOCUS GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMATIC RISK 38 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ggOO003.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON
LTCM].
3. See Investment Company Act § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004) (defining the requisite capital structure for investment companies). These restrictions
do not cover hedge funds because hedge funds to not have to register as investment
companies. See, e.g., HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 737 (14th ed. Foundation Press 2007) (describing various registration
exemptions that apply to hedge funds).
4. A straddle, which consists of buying both a put and a call around a given range on a
security, is one of many ways that an investor could use derivatives to benefit from volatility
regardless of the direction the market moves. A derivative instrument derives value from
underlying assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, real estate, etc. Examples of
derivatives include puts, calls, futures, forwards, and swaps.
5. See Hedge Fund Research, Inc., HFR Industry Reports Asset Flows,
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A. Hedge Fund Structure
Hedge funds in the United States are typically organized as limited
partnerships or limited liability corporations (LLP or LLC) to obtain the
benefits of limited liability.6 Hedge funds organized as limited partnerships
may pass tax consequences directly along to investors, although this may
expose investors to unrelated business taxable income.7 The hedge fund
advisor who serves as the general partner in the LLP or LLC owes
fiduciary duties to the limited partners.8 While there are approximately
10,000 hedge funds at this time, the industry is relatively concentrated,
such that the 100 largest funds control about 65% of the industry's total
assets. 9
Incorporation in a tax haven such as Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the
Cayman Islands, is common to minimize taxes and benefit from a looser
regulatory environment. ° Offshore incorporation particularly appeals to
non-U.S. citizens and tax-exempt investors such as pension funds."
Although estimates are inexact, observers believe that 43-80% of hedge
funds are organized offshore, 2 and that up to 62% of assets are managed in
offshore funds. 3 Many advisors oversee both funds that are organized in
the United States and at least one fund that is organized offshore to meet
http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/index.php?fuse=asset flows (last visited Apr. 5, 2008)
(listing strategies, including funds of funds, convertible arbitrage, distressed securities,
emerging markets, equity hedge, equity market neutral, equity non-hedge, event driven,
fixed income arbitrage, fixed income convertible bonds, fixed income diversified, fixed
income high yield, fixed income mortgage backed, macro, market timing, merger arbitrage,
Regulation D, relative value arbitrage, sector, and short selling).
6. Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the
SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 812 (2006); see
SCOTT, supra note 3, at 713 (stating that German, Japanese, and British funds commonly use
other organizational structures, such as contract or unit trust forms).
7. See JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS 47 (rev. and updated ed.,
Bloomberg Press 2005) (explaining that the majority of tax-exempt investors are unwilling
to accept unrelated business taxable income for tax reasons, and thus prefer offshore funds).
8. J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation,
Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 805 (2007).
9. Robert K. Steel, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Remarks on Private Pools
of Capital at the Treasury (Feb. 27, 2007) (transcript available at
www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp280.htm) [hereinafter Steel Remarks].
10. See SEC 2003 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at ix (discussing offshore hedge funds);
see also Lartease Tiffith, Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA is Doing Right and Why
the SEC Should Follow the FSA 's Lead, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 497, 500 (2007) (also
discussing offshore hedge funds).
11. Preiserowicz, supra note 6, at 812.
12. Tiffith, supra note 10, at 509 n. 76.
13. Bing Liang & Hyuna Park, Share Restrictions, Liquidity Premium, and Offshore
Hedge Funds 3 (Working Paper, Mar. 14, 2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-
967788).
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different investor preferences, although the investment strategy is often the
same.' 4 The following chart, provided by Liang and Park based on 2005
data from the Lipper TASS hedge fund database, reveals that funds
domiciled offshore have attracted by far the greatest share of assets.'"
TABLE 1:
ASSETS. 16
OFFSHORE DOMICILES ATTRACT THE LARGEST SHARE OF
Hedge Fund Industry by Domicile Country
Other Countries
15%
Bahamas
3%
Bermuda
7%
British Virgin
Islands
15%
United States
23%
Cayman Islands
37%
Due principally to regulatory reasons requiring minimum investments
ranging from $100,000 to $5 million, hedge fund investors are primarily
wealthy individuals and institutions.' 7 Historically, while the majority of
investors have been wealthy individuals, a study by McKinsey & Company
estimated that, for the first time in 2007, more than half of flows into hedge
funds (52%) originated from institutions.18 The specific investor mix can
vary widely. For instance, a European long-short equity fund with
approximately $1.1 billion under management, which prefers to remain
anonymous, had the following investor assortment in 2006.
14. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 3, at 723 (stating that one way to effectuate this legally
is to use a master/feeder structure, in which the domestic and offshore funds buy shares in a
Master Fund that invests the actual portfolio and enables the funds to have duplicate
holdings and returns).
15. Liang & Park, supra note 13, at 38.
16. Id. (using data from the Lipper TASS database).
17. NICHOLAS, supra note 7, at 34.
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TABLE 2: SAMPLE HEDGE FUND INVESTOR COMPOSITION' 9
Sample Investor Composition
Banks
Other Hedge
Funds
30%
11%
7% Fund of funds
300%/ 
Employees-
NHW Families
10%
Pensions
12%
Interestingly, almost one third of its investors were other hedge funds
although they were not formally funds of funds themselves.
B. Fees and Returns
Fund advisors are commonly compensated by an annual management
fee of 1-3% of assets under management plus a 10-30% share of the fund's
annual appreciation, which may or may not be measured above an index
benchmark.2 ° Hedge fund fees for assets under management average
2.07%, excluding the performance incentive fee, while mutual funds, by
comparison, average 1.43%. 21 "Two and twenty" (2% of assets under
management plus 20% of the fund's profits) is the most common hedge
fund fee structure and can compensate the fund advisor very attractively.22
18. Steel Remarks, supra note 9 (citing McKinsey & Company study).
19. $1.1 billion long-short European equities fund quoted on condition of anonymity.
20. SEC 2003 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at ix.
21. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 736.
22. Andrew Sorkin, Starting a Revolution in the Pay Structure for Hedge Fund
Managers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Nov. 17, 2006, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/
11/17/starting-a-revolution-in-the-pay-structure-for-hedge-fund-managers/ (stating that fees
can be much higher); see Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less Than $240 Million?
You're Off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at C1 (citing the example of
James Simons, who has posted gross returns of over 80%, and charges 5% of assets under
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For instance, a $5 billion absolute return fund that earned 10% for the year
and used a two and twenty fee structure would net the manager $200
million. Moreover, compensation can be far more than this; in their best
years, investors such as Eddie Lampert of ESL, James Simons of
Renaissance Technologies, and T. Boone Pickens of BP Capital each made
over $1 billion. In 2006, the twenty-five highest-paid hedge fund
investors earned $14 billion combined, and an advisor had to earn at least
$240 million to even be considered on Alpha Magazine's top twenty-five
hedge fund earners list. 24  In comparison, the CEO of Goldman Sachs
earned $54.3 million over the same period.25
A fund of funds, which helps investors diversify by investing in a pool
of hedge funds, typically also charges an asset-based fee and a performance
fee. These fee are 1% of assets under management and 10% of profits,
which result in a double layer of fees for investors as they still must pay the
fees of the underlying funds.2 6 Funds of funds can still be attractive to
investors, however, as they allow investors the benefits of diversification
without the usual minimum investment requirement of $100,000 at
multiple funds.
As with all investment vehicles, returns vary widely among hedge
funds. In 2006, hedge funds on average had a 12.9% return, compared to
13.6% for the S&P 500.27 Results in 2007 were better, when the hedge
fund industry averaged returns of 14.1% versus 5.5% for the S&P 500.28
Historically, hedge funds have average returns in line with the S&P 500,
but with lower volatility.2 9 Typically, a fund selects a benchmark against
which it measures its returns, and any return above the benchmark is
known as "alpha."3 °
Many funds follow an absolute return strategy that is designed to be
management and 44% of profits).
23. Ben White, Megabucks Deals for an Elite Few, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at 22.
24. Andrew Sorkin, The Billion Dollar Hedge Fund Club, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr.
24, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/hedge-funds-robber-barons-or-the-
new-financiers.
25. Anderson & Creswell, supra note 22.
26. Mark Hulbert, 2 + 20, and Other Hedge Fund Math, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, § 3,
at 4. For a simplified example, in a fund of funds worth $1 billion that appreciated 10% for
the year, the underlying funds would earn $40 million if their fee structure was two and
twenty, and the fund of funds would earn an additional $20 million, leaving the investor
with an after-fee return of 4%.
27. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Investment Firms Open to the Masses, But Should You
Buy?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2007, at F 1.
28. Morningstar, Inc. Reports Fourth-Quarter, Full-Year 2007 Hedge Fund
Performance, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/ idUS163302+17-
Jan-2008+PRN20080117.
29. VINH Q. TRAN, EVALUATING HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE 24 (John Wiley & Sons
2006).
30. This can include absolute return funds, which use a 0% benchmark.
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independent from the S&P or other benchmarks, and which offers
significant diversification benefits.3' Returns are measured after fees and
are often boosted by the use of leverage; hedge funds typically may borrow
200% or more of their assets under management. 2 Leverage boosts a
fund's return if the fund can borrow money at a cost lower than the rate of
return that the fund can make on that money. As a simplified example, a
fund with $1 billion of assets under management could borrow another $1
billion at 5% interest. If the fund earned 10%, its overall return to investors
would be $200 million (10% of $2 billion) less $50 million in borrowing
costs (5% of $1 billion) for a before fee return on equity of approximately
15% ($150 million/$1 billion). This return is substantially greater than the
simple 10% return on equity ($100 million/$1 billion) that the fund would
have earned without the use of leverage.
The use of leverage gives hedge funds a much greater impact on the
financial markets than the level of their assets under management would
suggest. For instance, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) had a
debt-to-equity ratio of 25:1, giving the approximately $5 billion fund a
$125 billion impact on the capital markets.33 The failure of highly-levered
funds such as LTCM and Amaranth raised concerns about the potential for
systemic market risk.34 The benefits and risks associated with the use of
extensive leverage are further discussed in Part V.A below.
Funds may also have a lockup period during which investors agree to
keep their money committed to the fund and not withdraw it. Customarily,
private equity and venture capital funds use multi-year lockups because
these funds' private investments typically remain illiquid until the
companies are sold. Hedge funds occasionally use one or two-year lockups
as well, as they allow the fund to focus on longer-term investments rather
than being concerned about a draw down if it has a bad quarter, which, in
turn, could force the fund to sell investments at an inopportune time.
Research of the TASS hedge fund database shows that out of
approximately 2000 funds, 31% had lockups of some duration.3" Several
researchers have found a positive relationship between a lockup provision
and aggregate fund returns. Aragon found that funds with lockups have
returns 4-7% higher than funds without lockups.3 6 One interpretation of
31. Verret, supra note 8, at 804.
32. Tiffith, supra note 10, at 501.
33. Id.
34. Steel Remarks, supra note 9, at 4 (defining systemic risk as the risk that one
financial firm's failure could severely impact the financial system, and, at an extreme,
"trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults that affect the financial system so
significantly that the real economy is adversely affected").
35. See Liang & Park, supra note 13, at 30 (featuring a table of funds with a lockup of
some duration).
36. Id. at 4 (citing George Aragon, Share Restriction and Asset Pricing: Evidence from
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this finding is that a lockup functions as an illiquidity premium, where
investors demand higher returns as compensation for increased illiquidity.37
C. Industry Growth
Hedge funds have grown rapidly from approximately 400 funds in
1992 to approximately 10,000 funds in 2007, and play a major role in
injecting liquidity into the market place.38 As of March 2007, global hedge
fund assets were estimated at $2.079 trillion, as compared to $186 billion in
1995.39 While other investment vehicles such as mutual funds account for
a greater share of assets under management, (e.g., mutual funds had $17.8
trillion under management as of 2005), hedge funds have a
disproportionately large impact on the capital markets due to their active
trading strategies.4 °  In 2006, one estimate claimed that hedge funds
accounted for up to 50% of daily trading volume in some asset classes.4 '
This rapid growth places hedge funds in the spotlight not only in the United
States, but also internationally. German Chancellor Angela Merkel
recently included hedge fund regulation as one of the key issues on the G8
agenda during its June 2007 summit meeting.4 2
the Hedge Fund Industry, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 33 (2007)). Liang and Park's research suggests
that offshore investors may actually receive a greater illiquidity premium for a lockup, along
with tax advantages. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
38. 2002 estimate from the SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1. 2007 estimate from
Jonathan Spalter, Calls for Increased Scrutiny of Hedge Funds are Rising. Managers
Should Think Twice Before Ignoring Them, ALPHA MAGAZINE, Feb. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articlelD = 1242213.
39. March 2007 estimate is from Global Hedge Fund Assets Top $2 Trillion, THE
EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ONLINE NETWORK, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.emii.
com/article.aspx?ArticlelD=1314205. 1995 estimate is from Hedge Fund Research, as
quoted by Robert Discolo, For the Mutual Fund Industry, Rapid Asset Growth has Led to
Mediocre Performance. Will Hedge Funds Suffer a Similar Fate?, ALPHA MAGAZINE, Jan.
22, 2007, available at http://www.iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articlelD=l 119739. Given
these estimates, assets under management by hedge funds have grown at a CAGR of 122%
from 1995-2007.
40. See ScoTT, supra note 3, at 712 (defining international financial transactions and
discussing the relationship between mutual funds and hedge funds).
41. Steel Remarks, supra note 9.
42. Spalter, supra note 38.
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Table 3: Growth in the Number of Hedge Funds
43
Hedge Fund Industry Experienced Rapid Growth
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D. Financial Market Impact: Benefits and Concerns
Hedge funds provide substantial benefits such as greater market
liquidity, improved market efficiency, more accurate pricing, enhanced risk
management, and wider portfolio diversification." They account for 40-
50% of all equity trades globally; they increase liquidity and deepen the
markets.4' Beyond the "vital role" in "materially enhancing market
liquidity" that hedge funds play, and the fact that they serve as "a crucial
ingredient in the price discovery process," hedge funds also boost the
general economy by providing jobs and by aiding the expansion of existing
businesses. 46 For instance, prime brokers, who provide hedge funds with
services such as trade consolidation, custody, financing, stock lending, and
back office technology, earned $7.5 billion in revenues in 2005.
4
1
Attributes of hedge funds that trouble policy makers include the high
levels of leverage that many funds use, the lack of transparency into their
holdings, the frequently short period of ownership, the separation of voting
from stock ownership enabled by derivates, the potential for market
manipulation, and the use of soft dollars. The short track records of many
hedge funds exacerbate several of these concerns; in 2006, the average
43. Tran supra note 29, at 46; Paredes infra note 167, at 982; Preiserowicz supra note
6, at 820; Spalter supra note 38.
44. See, e.g., SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at viii (presenting the wide range of
tangible benefits that hedge funds provide).
45. Verret, supra note 8, at 804.
46. Steel Remarks, supra note 9.
47. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 737 (discussing the influential role of U.S. securities
markets and analyzing the national GDP).
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hedge fund life span was 5.3 years, making it difficult to analyze long term
risks and trends. 48 Furthermore, there are concerns regarding funds' power
to derail politically sensitive deals, as was seen in the strong reaction to
The Children's Investment Trust (TCI) and Atticus Capital's successful
activism against Deutsche Bbrse's proposed bid for the London Stock
Exchange. In the aftermath of the failed deal, Rolf Breuer, the outgoing
Chairman of the Frankfurt stock exchange, accused TCI and other funds of
"rip[ping] into the heart of the German economy" and proposed new laws
to limit hedge fund activity.49 Similarly, the German Vice Chancellor
described hedge funds as "locusts" after the collapse of the merger.5 °
Critics are not only politically driven; they also include well-known
investors such as Warren Buffett, who describes the derivatives business as
"fraught with danger" and a "strange world" where the "imagination" of
traders comes into play when establishing valuations of long contracts."
Buffett hoped that his public statements about Berkshire Hathaway's
problems with its acquisition of General RE's derivatives business would
"prove instructive for managers, auditors, and regulators .... [W]e are a
canary in this business coal mine and should sing a song of warning as we
expire. ,12
11. SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN RELATION TO HEDGE FUNDS
Historically, securities regulation was the province of state
governments' blue sky laws until concern with securities fraud preceding
and during the Great Depression led Congress to pass the Securities Act of
1933." 3 This Act was followed by the Exchange Act of 1934, the
Investment Company Act, and Investment Advisor Act of 1940, as well as
other federal security regulations. While state blue sky laws continue to
exist and may be relevant to intra-state offerings, for the most part they
have been superseded by federal securities regulation.54 The following is a
48. Duff McDonald, The Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 2007, at 44.
49. Julia Kollewe & Damian Reece, Hedge Funds Accused of "Ripping Heart Out of
German Economy", INDEPENDENT, May 11, 2005, at 52.
50. Id.
51. Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Letter 2005, at 11 (Feb. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20051tr.pdf. Berkshire Hathaway
acquired General RE in 1998 for $25.5 billion and spent close to eight years unwinding its
derivative portfolio, eventually at a loss.
52. Id. at 11.
53. The name blue sky laws was coined by Judge McKenna in Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., where he referred to promoters who tried to sell nothing more substantial than "so
many feet of blue sky." 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
54. Congress amended section 18 of the Securities Act in 1996 such that most state blue
sky laws are preempted. E.g., JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS 390 (5th ed.
2005) (outlining limits of state regulation). Intra-state offerings, which are covered by
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summary of the portions of securities regulations most relevant to the
hedge fund industry.
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act primarily focuses on initial public offerings and
was motivated by a desire to ensure, as Franklin D. Roosevelt said, that
"every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element ... be concealed from the buying public."55 In general,
the Act requires issuers to register a security with the SEC before it is
offered to the public, unless the security is otherwise exempt. The term
"security" is widely defined in section 2(a)(1) of the Act to include
investment contracts, which are in turn defined as investments in a
common enterprise where the investor expects profits solely from the
efforts of others. 6 Given the encompassing definition of investment
contracts, investments in hedge funds clearly would be considered
securities and thus need to be registered if the funds do not fall under a
registration exemption. Because registration is an expensive process that
requires detailed disclosure, funds are structured specifically to ensure that
they fall into an exemption.57
Currently, hedge funds can avoid the Securities Act's registration and
prospectus requirements by using the private offering exemption in section
4(2), which is based on the belief that the sophisticated investor has less
need for protection from disclosure than the average investor. 8 To qualify
for the registration exemption provided by section 4(2), hedge funds must
abide by the limits of Rule 506, which provides a safe harbor for
compliance with section 4(2) as long as an offering has thirty-five or fewer
purchasers and is not publicly advertised. 9 The limits of Rule 506 are
section 3(a)(l 1) of the 1933 Act and the safe harbor of Rule 147, receive an exemption from
registration as long as the issuing company does business within a state and sells the
offering only to investors within that state. These offerings are still subject to state law,
however, as section 3(a)(l 1) and Rule 147 exempt the offering only from federal
registration requirements.
55. David Liffmann, Note, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisors Under the Investment
Advisors Act, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2147, 2154 (2005) (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2
(1933)).
56. The test for an investment contract remains largely unchanged since set forth in
SECv. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
57. Registration costs start around $200,000-$500,000 and can be even more for large
offerings. Joseph Castelluccio, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Businesses: Section 404 and the
Case for a Small Business Exception, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 429, 445 (2005).
58. See, e.g., Liffman, supra note 55, at 2155 (arguing that experienced investors are
more insulated from harm than less experienced investors).
59. Rule 506 is part of Regulation D, and provides that issuers who meet the conditions
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actually less restrictive than they may appear, as an offering can also be
sold to an unlimited amount of accredited investors who do not count
towards the thirty-five purchaser limit. The wide definition of accredited
investor covers all institutional investors, as well as wealthy individuals.
Specifically, Rule 501(a) defines accredited investors as various large
financial institutions and individuals with an income of over $200,000
(over $300,000 for a married couple) or net worth of over $1 million.
There are concerns, however, that a growing number of people with $1
million in net worth are not actually sophisticated investors with a high risk
tolerance, particularly when individuals are able to include their home
equity as part of their net worth. To meet these concerns, the SEC has
proposed a new category of "accredited investors" to include natural
persons who own at least $2.5 million in investable assets.60 Home equity
is not considered an investable asset, and thus could no longer be counted
towards meeting the net worth requirement.61
The only drawback to this wide dispensation from the registration
requirements is that hedge funds must also comply with the prohibition on
advertising in Rule 502(c), which mandates restrictions such as using
password-protection to prevent casual, unsophisticated investors from
stumbling across hedge fund websites.62  Despite these restrictions, the
section 4(2) exemption allows hedge funds to escape onerous registration
requirements while still serving the anti-fraud purpose of the Securities
Act, as section 4(2) exemptions do not exempt offerings from the anti-fraud
of the rule will not be deemed to be involved with a public offering under section 4(2) of the
Securities Act. Unlike Rules 504 and 505, Rule 506 does not establish a dollar limit on the
offering. But, 506(b)(2)(i) requires less than thirty-five purchasers, and with purchasers
who are non-accredited investors, 506(b)(2)(ii) requires either that issuers reasonably
believe such purchasers are sophisticated (having "such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment"), or that such purchasers be represented by a purchaser
representative who has such knowledge. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
60. SEC Votes to Propose Rule to Prohibit Fraud by Investment Advisors to Certain
Pooled Investment Vehicles; Also Votes to Propose Revisions to Criteria for Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Instrument Vehicles, Exchange Act Release No. 2006-208, 89
SEC Docket 1938 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter SEC Press Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-208.htm.
61. Andrew Sorkin, Many Investors Fume Over New Hedge Fund Rule, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Feb. 12, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/many-investors-
fume-over-hedge-fund-rule.
62. The SEC warned in a 1995 release that placing private offering materials on the
web for public access "would not be consistent with the prohibition against general
solicitation or advertising [in Rule 502(c)]." COX ET AL., supra note 54, at 307 (citing
Securities Act Release No. 33-7233, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 6, 1995)). The Commission
subsequently disciplined CGI Capital for failing to restrict access to its webpage to
sophisticated investors and for allowing investors to purchase securities online without first
determining whether they were sophisticated or accredited investors. See SCOTr, supra note
3, at 740-41 (mentioning the password requirement for online securities purchases).
2008] CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION 845
protections of section 12 and section 17.
B. The Exchange Act of 1934
While the Securities Act of 1933 primarily concerned initial public
offerings, the Exchange Act of 1934 focused on the regulation of the
secondary securities market. Congressional intent in passing the Exchange
Act was to reduce fraud and protect investors by increasing the disclosure
and distribution of material information.63 While hedge funds are exempt
from many of the restrictions of the Exchange Act because they fall outside
of the technical definitions of a broker and dealer, they are subject to a
subset of the ongoing reporting requirements. 64
In particular, hedge funds are subject to the beneficial ownership rules
in section 13(d) and section 13(g) of the Exchange Act, which require a
public filing when any person acquires beneficial ownership of 5% of a
company's stock.65 Under Rule 13d-3's definition, beneficial ownership
includes the power to direct the voting or disposition of any equity
securities, which typically includes hedge fund positions, even if the fund
does not have economic exposure due to offsetting derivatives.66 If a fund
builds a large position such that it has beneficial ownership of 10% or more
of a company's stock, then the fund is subject also to the reporting
requirements of section 16(a), as well as the limits on short swing profits in
section 16(b). 67  The beneficial ownership provisions are discussed in
further detail in Part IV.C.
Additionally, section 13(f) of the Exchange Act requires funds that
manage over $100 million in equity securities to disclose their positions on
a quarterly basis. Although rarely approved by the SEC, confidentiality
63. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 258 (1998) (discussing the
development of congressional policy to facilitate investor reliance on market integrity).
64. Hedge funds are not considered brokers because they are not "engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the accounts of others." Jonathan
Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines between Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 251, 267 (2006) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)
(2000)). Hedge funds also are excluded from being a dealer under the trader exemption,
which excludes "funds that do not buy and sell securities as part of a regular business." Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(B) & Supp. IV 2004).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d (2007); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also
Tiffith, supra note 10, at 511 (discussing beneficial ownership rules in sections 13(d) and
13(g) of the Exchange Act).
66. For the purposes of section 13(d) and section 13(g) of the Exchange Act, "a
beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, directly or indirectly . . . has or
shares: (1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such
security; and/or, (2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the
disposition of, such security"). 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.
67. Exchange Act § 16(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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exceptions to section 13(f) are a solution to fund managers' concerns with
competitiveness and are discussed further in Part IV.B. Finally, section
10(b)(5)'s prohibition of insider trading applies to hedge funds, as has been
seen in the recent SEC investigation of Pequot, and is discussed further
below in Part IV.A.
C. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates investment
companies and requires their registration with the SEC.68 An "investment
company" is broadly defined as an issuer that "holds itself out as being
engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities," which would typically
include hedge funds. 69 Nonetheless, hedge funds can usually avoid the
restrictions of the Investment Company Act by using exemptions found in
section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) of the Act. The exemption in section
3(c)(1) applies as long as an offering is not public and is made to fewer
than 100 investors. 70 Alternately, the exemption in section 3(c)(7) applies
to an unlimited number of accredited investors as long as they have over $5
million in investable assets and the offering is not public. 7' The definition
of "qualified purchaser" differs in the two exemptions: section 3(c)(1) uses
the Regulation D definition of $1 million in assets, while section 3(c)(7)
requires an individual to have a net worth of greater than $5 million, or to
invest greater than $25 million for others, to be an accredited investor
under that exemption.72 If the fund is advised by a registered advisor under
the Investment Advisors Act, the minimum asset requirement under section
3(c)(1) actually rises to $1.5 million, and the SEC is considering a further
increase to $2.5 million in investable assets.73  While hedge funds must
shape the limits on their clientele differently depending on which
exemption they choose, they typically can find an exemption from the
restrictions and registration requirement of the Investment Company Act.
68. Tiffith supra note 10, at 512.
69. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
70. "Any issuer whose outstanding securities ... are beneficially owned by not more
than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a
public offering of its securities" is not considered an investment company. Investment
Company Act § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
71. Bevilacqua, supra note 64, at 265-66; see Sherry Shore, Note, SEC Hedge Fund
Regulatory Implications on Asian Emerging Markets: Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 563, 571 n.58 (2005) (discussing the required disclosures that result from
avoiding SEC registration).
72. 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(51) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
73. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 738-39 (describing the Investment Advisors Act and
SEC considerations to raise minimum asset requirements).
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If hedge funds, like mutual funds, were defined as investment
companies, it would be extremely problematic for their typical strategies.
Section 18(f) of the Investment Company Act restricts leverage to 33% of
assets, limits investments in illiquid securities, and sets diversification
requirements that would fundamentally make the operation of a hedge
fund, as they are currently construed, impossible.74 Such rigid rules would
wipe out many of the varied categories of hedge fund strategies listed
above, which in turn would reduce investors' ability to diversify their
portfolios.
D. The Investment Advisor Act of 1940
The Investment Advisor Act was passed in 1940 with the goal of
reducing abusive practices by requiring investment advisors with more than
fifteen clients and greater than $30 million in assets to register with the
SEC, maintain certain records, and make ongoing disclosure statements on
Form ADV. 75 Form ADV requires investment advisors to disclose owners,
prior securities convictions and injunctions, and an annual balance sheet
among other things, and to distribute a brochure on business operations to
prospective clients.76 Recently, this Act served as the vehicle for the SEC's
mandatory registration efforts, which changed the definition of "client"
under the Act to force more hedge fund advisors to register.
The Act contained a broad private investor exemption in section
203(b)(3), which allows advisors to avoid registration if they have fifteen
or fewer clients. Until 2006, section 203(b) defined "client" as a legal
entity, such as a limited partnership that shares the same investment
objective, and allowed managers to count each fund that they managed as
one "client. 77 Thus, managers could advise up to fourteen funds before
they were considered investment advisors under the Act. The SEC
attempted to close this loophole for hedge fund advisors by amending Rule
203(b)(3)-1 and creating Rule 203(b)(3)-2, effective in February 2006,
which together required advisors to "look through" the legal structure of
their funds and "count each shareholder, limited partner, member, or
beneficiary of a private fund as a client., 78 If a fund had more than
fourteen U.S. clients, it had to register regardless of whether the fund was
incorporated offshore.79 Applying the look-through provision to funds in
74. Investment Company Act § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
75. Joseph Hellrung, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors are Knocking at the Door, But
Can the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317, 326
(2005).
76. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 749.
77. Bevilacqua, supra note 64, at 269; Tiffith, supra note 10, at 514.
78. Bevilacqua, supra note 64, at 270.
79. Liffmann, supra note 55, at 2179.
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the revised rule, regardless of whether they were incorporated offshore or
in the United States, helped to prevent funds from reincorporating offshore
to avoid registering as an investment advisor. 80 The only exception was
offshore funds managed by offshore managers, which did not have to
register.81 Interestingly, the amended rule specifically excluded private
equity fund advisors by excluding any fund with a lockup period of longer
than two years.82 Hedge funds advisors also could avoid registering as
investment advisors if they have a two year lockup, although this is rare
and unpopular with investors.
For hedge funds then considered to be investment advisors, the main
effects of the rule change were that such funds had to file and report basic
information on Form ADV, and were "generally prohibited from charging
performance fees unless investors have $750,000 invested with the
advis[o]r or have a net worth of $1.5 million. 83 In turn, this prohibition
led most funds to raise their minimum investment levels, a result congruent
with the SEC's desire to protect unsophisticated investors. As further
discussed in the review of the policy behind the push for mandatory
registration, found in Part VI.A below, the Goldstein court rejected the
amended Rule 203(b)(3) in 2006, and hedge funds are no longer required to
register.
Notwithstanding the Goldstein decision, hedge funds remain subject to
the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisor Act, which prohibit
funds from making material omissions or misrepresentations to investors,
regardless of their registration status. In December 2006, the SEC
proposed including all pooled investment vehicles under the antifraud
provisions of the Investment Advisors Act, regardless of whether the
pooled vehicle would otherwise be exempt under section 3(c)(1) or section
3 (c)(7) of the Investment Company Act.84  If passed as proposed, the
SEC's rule further clarifies that hedge funds are considered investment
companies for purposes of the antifraud provisions, and retain liability for
making "false or misleading statements" or "defraud[ing] investors or
prospective investors. 85
Hedge fund managers who disregard the anti-fraud provisions of the
80. See id. (discussing the lack of incentive to move offshore if a hedge fund advises
more than fourteen clients).
81. American Bar Association, Subcommittee on Private Investment Entities, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2006 WL 5440662 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/aba08l006.pdf.
82. See id. (discussing impact of amendment). Private equity and venture capital funds
typically have a lockup for several years, if not for the life of the fund, due to the illiquidity
of their investments.
83. Tiffith, supra note 10, at 516.
84. SEC Press Release, supra note 60.
85. Id.
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securities acts clearly are not immune from enforcement. Daniel Marino,
the former CFO of Bayou Management, was sentenced to twenty years in
prison in January 2008 after he pled guilty to defrauding investors of more
than $400 million.86 Along with the CEO, Marino misled investors as to
Bayou's assets under management and performance, two critical factors in
attracting new investors.
87
IV. DETAILS ON THE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO HEDGE
FUNDS
The principle regulations that apply to hedge funds at this time are the
beneficial ownership reporting mandates of the Exchange Act, of which
section 13(f) requires quarterly reports if a fund manages more than $100
million in equity securities, and the various antifraud provisions in section
12 and section 17 of the Securities Act. Disclosure requirements
particularly trouble hedge funds, many of which emphasize secrecy within
their investment process to create a competitive advantage. The primary
concern is that immediate disclosure of positions allows imitators to piggy-
back on the work of the better funds. This lowers the first mover's returns
if it is unable to complete building its position before the quarter end, at
which time the fund will need to disclose its position.
The following are the specific disclosure requirements that most hedge
funds face, along with a discussion of whether the application of securities
laws in this context serves the original goals of these laws.
A. Disclose or Abstain: Insider Trading
Insider trading rules naturally apply to hedge funds, as well as other
investors, and have led to several investigations of hedge funds by the SEC.
The basic rule is that any investor in possession of material, nonpublic
information must either disclose that information to the public or abstain
from trading based on it.88 One of the most prominent recent SEC insider
trading investigation of a hedge fund involves Pequot Capital Management.
The focus of the investigation was a $44 million investment that Pequot
made in Heller Financial in July 2001, just before Heller was acquired by
GE Capital.89 John Mack, who has since been named the head of Morgan
86. Chad Bray, Bayou's Ex-Finance Chief Sentenced to 20 Years, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2008, at B 13.
87. Id.
88. Exchange Act Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); See, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (concerning violation by corporate insiders).
89. E.g., Walt Bogdanich & Gretchen Morgenson, SEC Inquiry on Hedge Fund Draws
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at AI (discussing facts leading to SEC investigation).
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Stanley, was suspected of having passed insider information to Arthur
Samberg, Pequot's founder. The SEC investigator in charge of the case,
Gary Aguirre, testified before Congress that he was told he could not
interview Mr. Mack due to his political power and was soon after fired
from the SEC, despite having received a recent merit pay increase. 90
Congress later questioned the way in which Aguirre was fired and
requested that the SEC reopen the Pequot investigation.9' While the case
received extensive public scrutiny and raised important issues regarding the
overlap of politics with regulatory investigations, it did not raise unique or
novel regulatory issues.
B. Ongoing Disclosure of Investment Positions
The most common disclosure requirement stems from section 13(f) of
the Exchange Act, which requires institutional money managers who
exercise discretion over greater than $100 million of exchange traded or
over the counter quoted equity securities to disclose their aggregate
positions quarterly in Form 13F filings.92 The filing must be made within
forty-five days of the end of the quarter.93 Form 13F applies to only long
positions; there is no requirement to publicly report short positions,
securities that are not publicly traded, or OTC derivatives.
94
The rationale behind section 13(f) is that fund position disclosures will
"fill an information gap" and "increase investor confidence" in the U.S.
securities markets.95 The SEC may exempt any institutional investors from
these provisions under section 13(f)(2). Additionally, Rule 24b-2 of the
Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to delay or prevent disclosure otherwise
required by section 13 when necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.96 In reality, there is little deviance from
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes, SEC's Cox: Agency Reviewing Issues Raised in Senate
Probe, Dow JONES NEWSWIRE, Feb. 9, 2007 (reporting on SEC investigation).
92. See Exchange Act § 13(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f(1) (listing report requirements for
each equity security held on the last day of the reporting period to include issuer name, title,
class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount, and aggregate fair market
value of each such security).
93. See Henry Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811, 871 (2006) (describing the timing of the
required disclosure).
94. Andrew Kulpa, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of
Cooperative Game Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and
Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 78, 104 (2005); Hu & Black, supra note 93, at 872.
95. Businessweek.com, Do Hedge Funds Hold 'Trade Secrets'?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept.
12, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi2006091l3356291.
htm?chan=search (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
96. Exchange Act Rule 24b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2.
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the disclosure standard because the SEC approves both of these exceptions
extremely infrequently.
Historically, the SEC has not made section 13(f) a major focus of its
enforcement actions; SEC Chairman Cox and Randall Thomas found that
there were no enforcement actions for noncompliance with section 13(f)
from 1968, when the disclosure was mandated, to 2005. 9' Nevertheless,
section 13(f) is one of the more contentious disclosure requirements
because secrecy is often critical to building a position in a security that a
fund considers to be misvalued. As discussed in the next Part, Warren
Buffett demonstrated to the SEC that disclosures by Berkshire Hathaway
create temporary market spikes that hamper his investment program.
While the trade secret argument (also discussed below) is weaker than
Buffett's followership concern, both demonstrate that managers have
realistic concerns with respect to section 13(f). Thus far, the SEC has done
little to address these concerns, although a possible solution would be for
the SEC to delay disclosure for some slightly longer period, e.g., sixty to
seventy-five days rather than forty-five days; this would likely still serve
the purpose of informing the public and alleviating managers' concerns
about disclosing an investment thesis before they can fully stake out their
position.
C. "Followership" and Trade Secret Concerns Regarding the Disclosure
Requirements
A primary problem with the disclosure requirements of section 13(f)
of the Exchange Act is that the quarterly filings can be a competitive
disadvantage when a fund is in the process of building a position. As
mentioned above, Rule 24b-2 of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to
delay or prevent disclosure otherwise authorized by section 13(f), but the
SEC will generally keep a disclosure confidential only if revealing it would
expose an advisor's ongoing investment strategy, open risk arbitrage
positions, or block positioning strategies.98 In practice, the test is whether
the fund can demonstrate that disclosure "would be likely to cause
substantial harm to [the fund's] competitive position." 99  The
97. James Cox & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REv. 411, 447 (2005).
98. Exchange Act Rule 24b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2. This rule applies to a request for
confidential treatment of any information for which the Exchange Act requires disclosure.
See Division of Corporate Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1, "Confidential Treatment
Requests," (2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcflr.htm [hereinafter SEC Legal
Bulletin No. 1] (stating that Rule 406 serves the same purpose for any request for
confidential treatment of disclosures mandatory under the Securities Act of 1933).
99. In the Matter of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Order Affirming the Determination of the
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confidentiality exception within securities law is itself derived from one of
nine exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act, which would otherwise
require all information filed with the SEC to be made available to the
public.'00 The exemption most commonly used in securities law covers
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential."'10' Applicants must meet several
substantive requirements in their application, which cannot be overly
broad, should set forth an analysis for the exemption, and must specify the
duration of the requested confidentiality period.'02
Berkshire Hathaway made such a confidentiality request in February
2000 and August 2003. In its 2003 petition, Berkshire argued that "other
market participants would on learning of Berkshire's interest join in
acquiring the stock, causing a material increase in the price of the stock,
thus making pursuit of the acquisition program more costly."'0 3 Berkshire
also provided the SEC with a list of cases in which disclosure of a position
had been followed by increased prices in those securities. 10 4 Both times,
the SEC declined Berkshire's confidentiality request because it did not
demonstrate "the likelihood of substantial competitive harm" to the extent
required by the Exchange Act.'0 5 In its 2003 decision, the SEC recognized
that the disclosures had "[on] a number of occasions . . . resulted in
temporary spikes in the market," but was concerned that approving a grant
of confidentiality on those specific grounds would result in "a virtual per se
justification for confidentiality for Berkshire.' '0 6  The SEC appeared
willing to examine specific cases if further information about the expected
duration of the acquisition program, historic prices, and average daily
trading volumes could be provided.'0 7 On the whole, the wording of the
release implies that the SEC would be more inclined to approve delayed
disclosure of section 13(f) filings if it was provided with full details and
reassured that the acquisition program would be completed relatively
promptly.0 8
Phillip Goldstein, the hedge fund manager who successfully
challenged the revised Rule 203(b) mandating hedge fund registration, also
Division of Investment Management to Deny Confidential Treatment, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,368, 2003 SEC Lexis 1986 (Aug. 20, 2003).
100. SEC Legal Bulletin No. 1, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In the Matter of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., supra note 99.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Berkshire requested a confidentiality period of one year, which the Commission
may have likely viewed as unnecessarily long. Id.
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filed an application to exempt his fund from filing Form 13F on trade secret
grounds in September 2006.'09 He analogized his Bulldog Fund's holdings
to Coca Cola's confidential formula, and contended that section 13(f)
"constitutes a taking of the fund's property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."" 0  Interestingly,
Goldstein argued that section 13(f) may actually reduce investor protection
by inducing false over-confidence in the market and making investors less
likely to conduct full due diligence reviews before investing."' Few people
in the industry, however, agree with him. One commentator who manages
several billion dollars in a fund of funds commented that "the 13F is a very
valuable tool for us to fulfill fiduciary duties to our clients .... [It] allows
us to monitor the holdings of our external managers and ensure that their
monthly reports accurately reconcile with SEC filings.""' 2 As Goldstein
recognized, the SEC is extremely unlikely to provide a blanket exemption
from Form 13F for his fund."
13
While the SEC is unlikely to agree to delayed disclosure for a year, as
Berkshire Hathaway requested, or to exempt a fund from section 13(f)
requirements altogether, greater use of the Rule 24b-2 confidentiality
exception for brief periods of time would help allay fund managers'
concerns without undermining the purpose of making the holdings public,
i.e., filling the information gap and building public confidence in the
market. As it is, Form 13F filings are meant to represent a manager's
holdings rather than to reflect the fund's current positions given the
existing forty-five-day delay, as many funds turn over their holdings within
forty-five days. Lengthening that time period slightly, upon a request to
complete a specific acquisition program, to a period such as sixty to
seventy-five days, (which is the time span allowed to file 10-K's), should
not make the filings less representative or serve to undermine investor
confidence.
D. Disclosures of Beneficial Ownership Positions
The Williams Act, which is part of the Exchange Act of 1934, requires
preliminary reports if a significant stake of equity securities is acquired to
give other shareholders advanced notification of a possible takeover. As
mentioned in the record of congressional debates on amendments to
109. See Do Hedge Funds Hold 'Trade Secrets'?, supra note 95 (quoting Phillip
Goldstein).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (including reader comment of Ben S. to http://www.businessweek.com/
investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291 .htm?chan=search (Sept. 14, 2006)).
113. Id.
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sections 13 and 14, the goal of this portion of the securities acts is to ensure
that investors receive "timely, adequate, or sufficient information with
respect to accumulation of securities in the market and with respect to
conduct involved in tender offers."' 14 The primary provision is section
13(d) of the Exchange Act, which requires any party that becomes a 5%
beneficial owner of a registered class of equity securities to file a Schedule
13D report within ten days of reaching the 5% threshold." 5 The party must
also provide a copy of the report to the issuer and to the relevant exchanges
upon which the security trades. 16 A group may be deemed to act as a
single person and qualify for the 5% threshold if its members act together
for purposes of "acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities." '117
In addition, the Williams Act requires 5% beneficial owners who
acquire an additional 2% within a twelve-month period to file an updated
report with the SEC within ten days of such additional purchases." 8 In
either case, Schedule 13D contains the information that a purchaser must
disclose once it reaches the 5% threshold, which includes information
about the purchaser, the source, the amount of consideration used in the
purchase, whether the purpose is to acquire control or make other major
changes, the number of shares the purchaser owns, and information about
any contracts the purchaser has that relate to the issuer or security. Five-
percent holders do not need to make a new section 13(d) filing as long as
their additional purchases within a twelve-month time frame remain under
2%. 1 19
If an owner does not intend to propose a change in control of the
issuer, section 13(g) of the Exchange Act, which requires less disclosure,
can be used in place of section 13(d). In essence, section 13(g) requires the
disclosure of the name and description of the shares owned, the nature of
such interest, and whether any person has a right to receive the proceeds
from their sale. 2° While this is a less detailed disclosure than section 13(d)
requires, it still includes basic information regarding the size of the holding
that most hedge funds would prefer to keep confidential until they have
114. 134 CONG. REC. S7924 (1988).
115. Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 78m(d)(3).
118. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that the 5%
threshold under section 13(d) of the Exchange Act applies separately to each registered
equity class, so a fund may pass the threshold if it owns 5% of a firm's convertible
debentures, although they would not convert into 5% of the firm's common stock).
119. Exchange Act § 13(d)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
120. See In re Safeguard Scientifics, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23786, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(discussing required disclosure elements under section 13(g)); see also Exchange Act §
13(g)(1)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g)(1)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (listing required
disclosure elements).
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finished building a position in the stock.
If the investor fails to make the appropriate section 13(d) filing upon
reaching the 5% threshold, the target company has a private right of action
against the buyer. The key concern of a target is most often a tender offer,
which is not the outcome sought by most hedge funds, but can be an issue
for activist funds. If a tender offer is launched, there are specific reporting
requirements under section 14 that will not be discussed in detail here, as
generally few funds seek controlling ownership positions. The
convergence of the private equity and hedge fund industries may lead more
funds to seek control positions, but this Article focuses on the appropriate
regulatory regime for funds that do not seek such control.
Under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, as an investment firm's
holdings grow in size, it must report when it reaches a 10% beneficial
ownership threshold. z12  A short term holder will want to avoid 10%
beneficial ownership, because the holder would then need to surrender any
short swing trade profits to the corporation under section 16(b). 22 Short
selling is also prohibited for 10% beneficial owners. 23 The end result of
the restrictions in section 16 is that funds rarely buy more than 9.9%
ownership to retain investment flexibility.
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish activist hedge funds, which
seek control of a company or changes in management or strategy, from
purely investment-oriented hedge funds, which believe that a company is
undervalued or overvalued, but do not actively try to change the market's
valuation. In January 2007, Paul Kingsley estimated that there were
approximately 100 activist funds, with an estimated $50 billion in assets
under their control. 124 Prominent examples of activist investors include
Chris Hohn's The Children's Investment Trust and Atticus Capital, which
engaged in a public battle to prevent the acquisition of LSE by Deutsche
Borse. 12 5 Appropriately, section 13 requirements cover these activist funds
because they trigger the traditional concern to notify management when a
party interested in making fundamental changes in the business acquires a
large stake of securities. As a side note, section 13(d)'s 5% level actually
may be too high, as a smaller shareholder in an extremely large company
with a diversified shareholder base can exert some control with an even
121. Exchange Act § 16(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
122. See Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (stating that
a beneficial owner must be a 10% holder at the time of both purchase and sale to be covered
by the short swing trading restrictions).
123. Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
124. Paul R. Kingsley, Hedge Fund Activism and Its Impact on Corporate Boards,
PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 15, 17 (2007).
125. Carter Dougherty, Hedge Funds Queried in Deutsche Borse Case, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 16, 2005, Finance at 12, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/15/
business/boerse.php.
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smaller stake. For instance, Carl Icahn attempted to exercise substantial
control over Time Warner despite owning only a 3% stake in the
company. 126
The majority of hedge funds, however, are not activists, and it is
inappropriate to apply the same disclosure standard when the primary
purpose of warning of a potential tender offer is no longer valid. The
section 13(g) standard requires funds to make disclosures regarding their
ownership stake, regardless of their activist/non-activist position, and
despite the fact that doing so can limit their ability to finish building a
position in the stock. Extending the window for filing section 13(g) reports
would allay some of the investor concerns with followership while still
making the information publicly available within a reasonable time frame.
Currently section 13(d), (g), (f), and section 16 disclosures do not
provide all the information that critics want. Outstanding issues further
discussed below include funds' leverage ratios and "empty voting" through
the use of derivatives, neither of which can be tracked through current
disclosure requirements.
E. Open Issues Regarding Disclosure
One unresolved question is the disclosure of certain arrangements that
hedge funds occasionally use, including side letters and side pockets. A
side letter grants the specified investor preferential terms if a designated
event occurs, such as when a fund manager leaves, while a side pocket sets
different liquidity provisions for a certain segment of a hedge fund.
27
Investor approval is not always obtained before instituting one of these
arrangements. For instance, Scion Value Fund did not obtain investor
approval before it created a mandatory side pocket for its investments in
mortgage derivatives in November 2006.28 While creating the side pocket
protected the fund from having to unwind its investment at the wrong time,
which ultimately paid off when the subprime market collapsed in early
2007, some investors were furious that they were not given the choice to
exit the fund.1
29
Investors may also be concerned that side pockets, while reasonably
used to separate out illiquid investments, may instead be used as a
repository for losing trades. 13 ° A recent survey of in-house counsel at
126. Richard Siklos & Andrew Sorkin, Time Warner and Icahn Reach a Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at C1.
127. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 742 (establishing the difference between side letter and
side pocket).
128. Jenny Anderson, Winners Amid Gloom of Default, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at C1.
129. Id.
130. Chidem Kurdas, Headline Risk Tops Pension Concerns: Survey, HEDGEWORLD
DAILY NEWS (HedgeWorld News, White Plains, N.Y.), Apr. 9, 2007 (citing industry
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investment management firms revealed that they believe the use of both
side letters and side pockets is declining, along with the use of soft dollars,
as funds focus on increasing transparency to investors.' The SEC is also
investigating the use of side pockets, as are regulators in Hong Kong and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions.' SEC
intervention probably is unnecessary in this area, however, as market
discipline will likely lead to clauses in funds' investment mandates that ban
the use of such arrangements if investors feel they are being abused.
F. Public Policy Behind the Disclosure Standards
The push to regulate hedge funds is largely consistent with the policies
that have historically motivated securities legislation.' Two traditional
policy goals-protecting investors and reducing fraud-were also behind
the drive for mandatory registration. Nevertheless, many of the concerns
with fraud are currently addressed, as hedge funds are not exempt from the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts. Often considered one of the
most powerful anti-fraud provisions, section 12 of the Securities Act
already applies to hedge funds if they make false or misleading statements,
as do section 17(a) and the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisor
Act.
Historical concerns that promote ownership disclosure are most
relevant to activist hedge funds. The distinction between an activist and
non-activist hedge fund is that the former encourages companies to make
strategic changes, while the latter invests passively. The primary purpose
of the Williams Act disclosure requirements in sections 13 and 16 was "to
insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer
for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information
regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party., 14 These
concerns, which are appropriate in a tender offer situation and thus ought to
apply to activist hedge funds, do not apply when control is not an end goal.
The SEC recognizes this to some extent and allows funds to file a Form
13G rather than a Form 13D when funds reach a 5% beneficial ownership
threshold and do not intend to suggest changes in the company.
The most relevant outstanding policy concern for hedge funds is
investor protection, particularly with the growing involvement of retail
investors. This is further discussed in the upcoming Part, but the SEC has
concerns).
131. Counsels Continue to See Decline in Side Pocket, Soft Dollar Use, COMPLIANCE
REPORTER (Inst. Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2007, at 5.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Liffmann, supra note 55 (recounting history of hedge funds).
134. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
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not presently found a coherent response. Although it has proposed raising
the accredited investor standard, this may be difficult to sustain as other
countries concurrently lower their investment requirements for retail
investors in hedge funds. Regulatory convergence, particularly with the
FSA in the U.K., makes it likely that the SEC may reconsider raising the
standard, and may actually lower it in the long run. Instead, a more
effective approach to investor protection would be for the SEC to focus on
vigorous enforcement of the current fraud rules, which make material
misrepresentations and omissions to investors illegal. These existing tools,
if used effectively, will appropriately penalize fraudulent funds without
increasing the regulatory burden on the hedge fund industry as a whole.
V. REGULATORY CONCERNS WITH HEDGE FUNDS
The following Part discusses issues that remain at the forefront of
critics' minds, such as leverage, empty voting, retailization, market
manipulation, soft dollars, and short term investing. Most of these issues
are not limited to hedge funds; many apply to other private pools of capital,
including private equity or mutual funds.
A. Leverage
Hedge funds' customary use of leverage raises concerns that the
funds' unregulated status could allow them to "potentially wreak havoc on
the world financial markets," principally through large losses that could
force them to quickly liquidate their positions.135 These losses can be
exacerbated in highly leveraged funds, as was seen in the failure of Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1999 and more recently with the
rapid losses that Amaranth Advisors experienced in the fall of 2006.36 A
fund's increased vulnerability to a reversal in turn increases systemic risk
to the market place and leads to concerns that the failure of one or two
large firms could trigger a chain reaction.
Derivatives are one of the primary leverage methods funds use, as puts
and calls can be bought for a fraction of the underlying value of the
security, but enable a fund to capture the gain if the security moves in the
expected direction. While this helps boost returns if the market moves in
line with the investment thesis, it can expose the firm to enormous
downside losses if the market moves contrary to the bet, as happened to
135. Jonathan Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar's Poker, 35 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 591, 592 (2001).
136. See, e.g., NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (John Wiley & Sons Ltd.) (2001)
(describing Long Term Capital Management's failure).
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Amaranth Advisors. Amaranth invested principally in energy futures, and
when the market moved against its positions in September 2006, Amaranth
lost approximately $6.5 billion.'37 Similarly, LTCM's rapid losses came
relatively close to fulfilling many critics' prophesy that leveraging would
lead to a potential systematic collapse of the financial system, which was
why the federal government encouraged banks to invest in LTCM, shoring
it up such that it could liquidate its positions in an orderly manner rather
than in a fire sale. 38  The use of leverage did not surprise LTCM's
investors. LTCM disclosed to investors that it planned to make "extensive
use of borrowed funds" and consistently maintained leverage of twenty-one
times their equity or greater.'39 If highly-levered funds start to experience
large losses with increased frequency, investors will likely begin to pay
more attention to leverage levels, acting as a market check.
A natural check on the leverage of a hedge fund is the internal risk
management systems of its counterparties, who stand to lose large sums of
money if the fund cannot fulfill its side of a derivatives contract. LTCM's
counterparties would have lost $300-500 million each and $3-5 billion
collectively if LTCM had failed. 40 As LTCM's trades moved against its
predictions, its counterparties insisted on marking-to-market the positions
and demanded extra collateral from LTCM, which in turn made the traders
at LTCM feel that "their counterparties [were] easing them into a death
spiral." '41 In its review of LTCM's collapse, the General Accounting
Office found that the "banks and securities and futures firms that were its
creditors and counterparties failed to enforce their own risk management
standards."' 142  The report concluded that "lapses in market discipline"
created the potential for systemic risk, but also noted the response where
the potential losses posed by LTCM "prompted strong reactions from
virtually all large firms that were counterparties of hedge funds and an
increased sense of awareness regarding risk management policies."'
143
Risk management improved post-LTCM, bringing down leverage and
thus market liquidity. Dunbar estimates that liquidity in certain markets
137. Group Seeks Subpoena ofnAmaranth's Records, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2006, at B3.
138. The panic resulting from the widespread fear that LTCM would be forced to
liquidate its positions led people to avoid the markets, such that "now ... there was no
market, as all the high-yield investors stayed at home. It was the same in the mortgage bond
market." Bill McDonough, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
became increasingly involved in negotiations with the investment banks throughout
September and October of 1999. See DUNBAR, supra note 136, at 217.
139. GAO REPORT ON LTCM, supra note 2, at 41.
140. Id. at 12.
141. DUNBAR, supra note 136, at 213.
142. GAO REPORT ON LTCM, supra note 2, at 2.
143. Id. at 10, 13.
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dropped by over 90%. 144  Eventually leverage levels rebounded, but
experiences such as LTCM and Amaranth remind counterparties of the
need for solid risk management systems, as they will pay the cost if there is
a large scale liquidation event. In May 2007, a New York Federal Reserve
economist suggested that "[r]ecent high correlations among hedge fund
returns could suggest concentrations of risk comparable to those preceding
the hedge fund crisis of 1998," making it clear that leverage is still a
significant regulatory concern. 145 On the whole, however, while there is the
potential moral hazard that banks will grant hedge funds unreasonably high
leverage if they believe the Federal Reserve will bail them out, hedge
funds' potential counterparty risk should be a sufficient check on leverage.
A more recent pullback on leverage came in the fall of 2007, as a decline in
the value of subprime mortgages led to volatile markets and a decline in the
amount banks were willing to lend to hedge funds.146 Margin calls and the
impact of leverage led to several hedge fund failures in late 2007 and early
2008, but these losses occurred without causing a systemic collapse or
creating the need for federal intervention. 147
Additionally, investment consultants who serve pensions and high net
worth families have incentives as fiduciaries to not risk a negligence
lawsuit by recommending a highly levered-fund. One consultant, Rocaton
Investment Advisors, was sued by the San Diego County Employees
Retirement Association (SDCERA) for recommending Amaranth and
eventually settled the claim for $2.75 million. 148  While this is only a
fraction of the $105 million that SDCERA lost, it is a sufficiently stiff
penalty to make consultants take leverage levels into account when
recommending funds. 149 The combination of increased investor awareness
of leverage risks, improved counterparty risk management systems, and
rising litigation risks for investment consultants should result in sufficient
discipline to keep leverage in check without the need for more rigid formal
regulations, such as the rules for mutual funds in the Investment Company
144. DUNBAR, supra note 136, at 240 (citing one trader's estimate).
145. Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2007/20070502_Headline 10309 iWriter.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (reproducing Hedge Funds May Pose Huge Market Risks,
CNNMONEY.COM (May 2, 2007)).
146. Gregory Zuckerman & Alistair MacDonald, Hedge Funds Feeling Pinch on Credit,
Too-Brokers, Banks Raise Loan Rates, Say 'No' to Potential Clients, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
2007, at Cl.
147. See, e.g., Roddy Boyd, Anatomy of a Hedge Fund Collapse, CNNMONEY.COM,
Mar. 7, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/06/news/companies/boyd-tequesta.fortune/
index.htm?postversion=2008030707 (explaining how leverage and margin calls contributed
to the failure of the Tequesta Mortgage fund).
148. Emma Blackwell, Rocaton Pays $2.75M for Recommending Amaranth, MONEY
MGMT. LETTER, Apr. 5, 2007.
149. See id. (discussing settlement's implications).
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Act.
B. The Separation of Voting Rights and Economic Ownership
Corporate law is largely based on the premise that voting power is
proportional to economic ownership, and that the coupling of shares and
votes creates a market for corporate control. 50 There are some exceptions,
such as when different classes of stock have different voting rights and
values.' The difference in voting rights, however, is public information,
and shareholders who buy a class of shares with limited rights are fully
informed that they are purchasing economic ownership that does not
include a voice in its corporate governance. The growth in derivatives has
undermined this distinction and enabled investors to buy or sell voting
power-essentially corporate control-separately from economic
ownership. 5 The basic method is to buy an equity stake in the corporation
in question and sell an offsetting amount of stock short, such that the voting
rights are retained, but not the economic interest in the stock.'53 Hu and
Black describe the decoupling of economic ownership and voting rights,
which is principally done through the use of derivates, as "empty
voting."'
' 54
Empty voting is most likely to become an issue when a proposed
merger or acquisition is under consideration and funds can attempt to
influence the outcome of a merger arbitrage opportunity.'55 There are two
principal concerns with empty voting. First, it can allow negative
economic ownership and thus permit an investor to vote in ways that
150. Hu & Black, supra note 93, at 814.
151. See, e.g., Stroh v. Blackhawk Holdings, 272 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1971) (legitimizing
classification schemes that give one class greater control over the corporation, such as where
a private corporation that goes public often reserves voting power for one class of shares, of
which it preserves ownership, and then sells a Class B or other class that has either minimal
or no voting power).
152. Vote buying is not illegal per se; Delaware uses a three-part test from Schreiber v.
Carney to evaluate vote buying, which looks at whether the purpose was to defraud or
disenfranchise nonparticipating shareholders and examines the fairness of the underlying
transaction. 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982). See Jonathan J. Katz, Note, Barbarians at the
Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to Acquire Low Cost Corporate Influence and its Effect on
Shareholder Apathy, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1483, 1511-13 (2006) (discussing Schreiber's
departure from a per se rule, toward a fact-sensitive approach to vote-buying cases).
Shareholder disenfranchisement is a weak argument against practices such as Perry's, as
shareholders explicitly give their consent to stock lending and receive interest in return. Id.
at 1514.
153. See id. at 1503 (describing Perry Corp.'s strategy).
154. Hu & Black, supra note 93, at 815.
155. See Katz, supra note 152, at 1486-87 (explaining a hedging technique to gamer
voting influence in a pending transaction).
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actually reduce the firm's value, to benefit from a drop in its share price.
5 6
While board members owe fiduciary duties to the firm, shareholders
generally do not owe fiduciary duties to each other.'57 Second, vote buying
is often secretive, as securities rules seldom require its disclosure.' This
means that other shareholders may be unaware of divergent incentives that
could motivate a voting decision, particularly in sensitive cases such as
those that consider an acquisition or a vote on a proposed leveraged buyout.
One important limit on the extent of empty voting is section 16(c) of
the Exchange Act, which prohibits short selling by any entity that owns
more than 10% of any class of a corporation's stock. As short selling is an
essential ingredient in the empty voting strategy, section 16(c) effectively
limits a hedge fund to acquiring 10% of the vote. 5 9
One of the best public examples of empty voting was provided by
Perry Capital, which acquired a 9.9% stake in Mylan Laboratories when it
made a bid to take over King Pharmaceuticals, and then eliminated its
economic exposure to Mylan through swaps and short transactions.1
61
Perry planned to use its voting power to swing the vote for the merger,
against the wishes of Carl Icahn, who was Mylan's second-largest
shareholder with 9.8% of the stock.' 6' Note that both Perry and Icahn
remained under a 10% ownership threshold for different reasons: Perry did
not want to invoke the section 16(c) prohibition against short selling for
10% beneficial owners, and Icahn did not want to invoke the section 16(b)
prohibition against short-swing profits for 10% owners. King
Pharmaceutical ultimately withdrew from the deal, but the main contention
is that Perry failed to disclose in its 13D filing that it was not taking an
economic interest in the company. The SEC served a Wells Notice on
Perry Capital in January 2006 and is currently investigating the trading
techniques used in the deal. 162 Vote purchasing is not per se illegal, but its
behavior could be considered a market manipulation and a violation of the
spirit of the disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.
Critics suggest that the SEC should declare this type of morphable
ownership to be void, despite the apparent legality of its underlying
156. Hu & Black, supra note 93, at 815.
157. Shareholders with majority control are more likely to owe fiduciary duties to other
shareholders, however, given their controlling position.
158. See Hu & Black, supra note 93, at 818 (discussing legal disclosure gaps).
159. Katz, supra note 152, at 1507.
160. See, e.g., Andrew Sorkin, S.E.C. Plans to Accuse Hedge Fund of Violations, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C3 (discussing how Perry's maneuver to become Mylan's largest
shareholder ensured Mylan could approve the deal that Icahn, Mylan's next-biggest
shareholder, wanted to block).
161. Id.; see Katz, supra note 152, at 1503 (explaining Perry's strategy to neutralize
Icahn's substantial opposition, increase the chance of merger, and secure potential profits).
162. Sorkin, SEC Plans to Accuse Hedge Fund of Violations, supra note 160.
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methods, on the grounds that it allows the voting process to be "hijacked"
by hedge funds with "distorted voting incentives."' 163 Jonathan J. Katz, the
author of a note on this subject, specifically suggests that the practice of
empty voting will undermine the value of control premiums and foster
economic loss, which will exacerbate shareholder voting apathy by leading
to "los[t] confidence in the notion of a corporate democracy.' ' 164 In the
U.K., hedge funds voluntarily are moving away from empty voting and
have proposed adopting a self-regulated standard that forbids funds from
borrowing stock solely to make use of their voting rights. 1
65
Despite legitimate concerns, a ban on "empty voting" is overly broad
and unnecessary. First, a party with true control, as in majority ownership,
retains the power to decide the outcome of a shareholder vote. Katz
erroneously refers to Carl Icahn's position in Mylan as an example of
thwarting the control premium and fails to note that Icahn did not have
control over the corporation with 9.8% of its stock and did not pay a
control premium for his stake. Icahn's failed plans for Mylan had nothing
to do with the value of control premiums, as he had no reasonable
expectation to earn such a premium. Second, the increase in institutional
shareholders has already undermined the will to vote among individual
shareholders, who correctly conclude that their votes will have little effect
on the outcome. For any party willing to take a large position to influence
the outcome of a vote, the possibility of buying votes, as Perry did, is an
equally viable option and makes the vote no less of a corporate democracy.
Methods change over time, but Perry and other hedge funds do not have a
monopoly over the ability to acquire voting influence. While a reasonable
policy for the SEC would be to enforce disclosure of a fund's individual
voting and economic stakes in Form 13D filings, it would make little sense
for the SEC to arbitrarily declare this use of derivatives, which is open to
any party, to be void.
C. Hedge Funds as Retail Investments
One of the SEC's key concerns with hedge funds is their
"retailization," as average "retail" investors have increasingly demanded
access to hedge funds along with sophisticated accredited investors.
66
Both pension funds and funds of funds enable average investors to at least
163. Katz, supra note 152, at 1487.
164. Id. at 1516.
165. See Cassell Bryan-Low, European Hedge Funds Issue Disclosure Guides, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at C6 (noting that some of Europe's largest hedge fund managers
issued voluntary best-practice standards that included a provision against borrowing stock
solely to use its voting rights).
166. See Preiserowicz, supra note 6, at 840 ("If hedge funds will be 'for the masses,'
then the SEC feels it has an obligation to regulate the industry.")
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indirectly invest in hedge funds, although these individuals would likely
not meet the definition of an accredited investor or the funds' minimum
investment level requirements on their own. As hedge funds become more
widely used investment vehicles, the SEC's mandate to protect individual
investors becomes increasingly relevant. Former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan has commented that "should hedge funds accept
capital from retail investors they should be under the same regulations as
mutual funds.' 67 Applying the Investment Company Act to hedge funds as
well as mutual funds, however, would fundamentally change the hedge
fund industry, given the Act's diversification requirements, limits on short
selling, and leverage limits. 168  This would be a drastic, overly-broad
response to the problem.
One way the SEC has dealt with retailization concerns is its attempt to
tighten the definition of accredited investor, as mentioned above.
Nonetheless, wealth may not necessarily be a proxy for sophistication and
access to information, particularly for individual investors. Moreover, even
wealthy individuals who would meet the SEC's standards for accredited
investors do not necessarily feel that they have all the information they
need to invest in hedge funds. In a recent poll by U.S. Trust, three out of
four wealthy investors said that "hedge funds are difficult to investigate"
and "it is difficult to find a good fund."'169 While the SEC's concern with
"retailization" reflects Congress' mandate of investor protection as part of
the Securities Act, equitable concerns also limit wealthy investors' right to
these returns. To protest the SEC's proposal to raise the accredited investor
standard, one irate investor wrote, "I believe that limiting any type of
investment based on how much money a person owns is unfair and
discriminatory .... The amount of money a person has to lose should not
be used as a measure of that person's sophistication as an investor."' 70
While this goes against the grain of the securities' laws paternalistic
concern with investor protection, it is a valid concern, and individual
investors arguably have better access to information and risk measures with
modem technology than ever before.
Most recently, several pooled investment vehicles conducted initial
167. Troy Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 1003 (2006) (citing Hearing on the
Nomination ofAlan Greenspan to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004)).
168. See Investment Company Act § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004) (setting relevant requirements and limits).
169. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Wealthy Say No Better at Finding Top Hedge Funds,
REUTERS, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idUSN2441440420070424.
170. Neal Lipschutz, Mom and Pop Want Access to Hedge Funds, Dow JONEs NEWS
SERV., Jan. 31, 2007.
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public offerings (IPO's) such that retail investors could directly invest in
them without meeting the minimum investment standards that would
otherwise be required. For instance, Fortress Investment Group, which has
$9.4 billion in hedge fund assets as well as private equity investments,
conducted an IPO in February 2007 and raised $634 million.'' On the one
hand, these securities are registered and thus require the firms to divulge
substantially more information to potential investors than they otherwise
would release. Fortress will also have a board with a majority of
independent directors to oversee it, as required by NYSE listing rules.1
2
On the other hand, concerns remain about the appropriateness of riskier
investments for financially unsophisticated retail investors. Some
commentators have attempted to allay these concerns by describing the
Fortress shares as more akin to an equity investment, without the risks or
rewards of a typical hedge fund investment, because the shares are in the
management company rather than the underlying investment vehicles.
73
However, the success of the management company remains entirely
dependent on the vicissitudes of the underlying fund, as the performance
fees they earn depend on a combination of assets under management and
performance, as described in Part II.B above. Blackstone Group, a private
equity fund, raised $4.13 billion in an IPO in June 2007.17 Similarly,
investors hold shares in the management company rather than in the
underlying funds. While Blackstone is a private equity fund, its IPO
reflects a trend that is likely to increase general public access to these
previously unattainable funds within the near future.
Internationally, the approach to retail investors varies. Singapore and
Hong Kong allow all investors to access hedge funds and set much lower
minimum investment requirements. 17' Hedge funds are also open to almost
all investors in Germany, although they are subject to portfolio restrictions
and risk diversification requirements more stringent than those applied in
the United States. 76  The rationales behind the policies vary; Germany
hoped to "kick start their financial markets by making hedge funds more
accessible," while some countries simply think it is inequitable to restrict
the potential high rewards of hedge fund investment to the wealthy, despite
171. Dow Jones, IPO Report: Fortress Investment IPO to Make Hedge-Fund History,
Dow JONES Bus. NEWS, Feb. 4, 2007.
172. Paul Fruchbom, Welcome to Club Hedge, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2007, at 17.
173. See Eleanor Laise, Hedge Funds Beckon Small Investors-As a Major Private-
Money Management Firm Goes Public, Individuals Face "Alternative" Choices of Varying
Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at Dl (noting Fortress shares are not hedge fund shares
and thus lack the same risks and rewards).
174. See, e.g., Blackstone IPO is Priced at Top End of Range, L.A. TIMES, June 22,
2007, at C4.
175. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 739.
176. Id. at 741.
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the potential risk.'77 The Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is the
U.K.'s regulatory body, has also widely debated "retailization," but
announced in March 2007 that it intends to allow retail investors to invest
in hedge funds.
178
Given the convergence between the SEC's and the FSA's regulatory
approaches, greater access for retail investors is likely to emerge in the
United States too. On the whole, the SEC appears to be fighting a losing
battle against "retailization" by raising the accredited investor standard
when retail investors can indirectly access the same companies, either
through funds of funds or through public offerings of funds such as
Fortress and Blackstone. A better approach may be to focus on the
availability of information to retail investors and to ensure that potential
investors receive full disclosure, which could help them understand what
risk adjusted returns mean.
D. Market Manipulation
Several allegations charge hedge funds with shorting stocks and then
manipulating the market by convincing ostensibly independent security
analysts to write negative reports. Cases include Biovail Corp. Securities
Litigation and Overstock.corn v. Gradient and David Rocker, a short
seller. 7 9 In Biovail, the central allegation was that S.A.C. committed fraud
by using a "short and distort" strategy, in effect ghostwriting research
reports published by Gradient Research Analytics.'80 Similar claims were
made against Gradient and Rocker in Overstock.com's suit. Patrick Byrne,
Overstock.com's CEO, accused hedge funds, journalists, and regulators of
acting together "under the direction of an unidentified 'Sith Lord"' in an
October 2005 conference call.'' More specifically, Byrne contended that
10 major brokerage U.S. brokerages deliberately attempted to drive down
Overstock.com's price. 82  Despite Overstock.com's charges, the SEC
closed its investigation of Gradient Analytics without taking action, which
177. Id.
178. See id. at 752 (noting that Regulation D is a safe harbor provision for all
transactions that meet the requirements of Rule 506 of the Securities Act of 1933).
179. In re Biovail Corp. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Overstock.com, Inc.
v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 688 (Ct. App. 2007).
180. See Brooke A. Masters, 2 Firms Claim Conspiracy in Analyst Reports, WASH. POST,
Apr. 26, 2006, at DI (describing "short and distort" strategy); Leonard Zehr, Short Sellers
Had Knives Out for Drug, Biovail Charges; Lawsuit Alleges Funds Targeted Cardizem,
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 20, 2006, at B3 (discussing Biovail claims).
181. Michael Kahn, California Appeals Court Weighs Overstock Libel Suit, REUTERS
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2007.
182. Id.
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suggests that the allegations have no solid grounding in securities law.,
83
Nevertheless, the judge has thus far refused to dismiss Overstock.com's
lawsuit as frivolous.
These lawsuits illustrate that litigation risk can have a prohibitive
effect on shorting. This is unfortunate, as shorting serves the valuable
purpose of allowing investors to directionally hedge their positions, as well
as revealing market sentiment about a stock and tipping off regulators to
potential fraud. 8 4 If litigation fears drove most short sellers out of the
market, the market as a whole would be negatively impacted, as the short
ratio on a stock is a valuable indicator of market sentiment. Additionally,
the suits raised free speech concerns, as they effectively penalized short
sellers for discussing their often legitimate concerns in regards to a
company. Critics of both Biovail and Overstock.com legitimately believed
the companies were overvalued; for instance, Overstock had never been
profitable and was experiencing declining revenue.185
Typically, short selling does not concern CEO's if the underlying
concerns are false, because they realize that an efficient market will
correctly price a security over time, as it otherwise creates arbitrage
opportunities. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market can
effectively sort through a vast array of information, which may include
misinformed viewpoints that could encompass purposefully misleading
reports, to arrive at the true price of securities. 86 Finally, the lawsuits also
exhibit a selective bias, as they do not target distortion of stock prices
through promotion by analysts overall, but rather only those who "short
and distort." In the eyes of the SEC, upside distortion can be just as serious
of a crime, as was seen in the events that led up to the Global Research
Analyst Settlement in 2003-2004.187
Anti-short sellers have turned to tools beyond lawsuits in their efforts
to increase disclosure of short selling and to halt the practice. Patrick
Byrne, the CEO of Overstock.com, lobbied the Utah State Legislature to
183. Marcy Gordon, SEC Ends Probe of Research Firm in Case that Sparked Press
Furor, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 2007.
184. See Joe Nocera, Revisiting Overstock.com and Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, at
Cl (discussing Overstock.com's rapid drop in stock value, and noting "most shorts have
gone underground because they don't want to be sued").
185. Christopher Faille, Overstock Sues 10 Brokers, 100 Does, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2227615.
186. See, e.g., Cox ET AL., supra note 54, at 106 (discussing the market's power to sift
through large quantities of information).
187. New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer led an investigation of conflicts of
interest in Wall Street research, resulting in a $1.4 billion settlement that involved ten banks
and federal regulators, and became known as the Global Research Settlement. See, e.g.,
Christopher O'Leary, Cracks in the Chinese Wall: Four Years After the SEC Settlement, is
Street Research Withering in the Shadows, INV. DEALERS' DIGEST, Mar. 5, 2007, at 19
(reviewing the general pitfalls of upside distortion).
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make naked short selling illegal, briefly resulting in a law that would have
allowed companies to find out who was shorting them and to file suit on
technical "failure to deliver" terms.'88 The state legislature repealed this
law within months, after the Securities Industry Association lobbied with
SEC support and made it clear that regulating short sellers is within the
purview of the federal, not the state, government.
8 9 Lobbying probably
will not lead the government to outlaw short selling, given the clear results
of the case, the support of the SEC, and the value of shorting as an
indicator of market sentiment.
Exchanges have rules that aim to prevent shorting from turning into a
wave of speculation against a company, such as by allowing short sales
"only when the last recorded change in the stock price is positive."' 90 The
SEC is concerned with connections between short sales and market
manipulation and believes that the "general purpose of the short sale rule is
to prevent manipulative sales of a security for the purpose of accelerating a
decline in the price of such security."' 9' Of course, investors can still build
a substantial short position simply by waiting for an uptick in the price and
then placing their order, but rules such as this help to prevent shorting from
exacerbating a fast fall in stock prices. After NASDAQ's approval as an
exchange on January 13, 2006, the SEC agreed to suspend temporarily the
application of the price test to securities traded on the NASDAQ in order to
"avoid unnecessarily burdening the markets" and to "evaluate the overall
effectiveness and necessity of such restrictions."' 92 It appears that the trend
is moving away from restrictions such as the uptick rule as shorting
becomes a more standard, quotidian practice. On the whole, this makes
sense because formalistic rules such as the uptick rule are relatively easy to
work around, but add significantly to the regulatory burden on exchanges.
188. Nocera, supra note 184. Customarily a short seller borrows stock before it sells
them to others, and then purchases shares to cover the ones it borrowed. Naked short selling
involves selling stock that the investor has not borrowed or bought, which can lead to large
losses if the market moves against the seller. See, e.g., Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 92,
713 (2005) (reviewing the covered call position, which Bodie defines as the purchase of a
share of stock with a simultaneous sale of a call on that stock).
189. Nocera, supra note 184.
190. BODIE ET AL., supra note 188, at 92; see also Regulation of the Short Sale Price Test
and Rule 10a-l(a), Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 (July 3,
2007) (amending short sale price test under Exchange Act to foster a more consistent
regulatory environment).
191. The Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 2239426 at *1
(July 20, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-
noaction/chx072006.pdf.
192. Id. at *2.
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E. Soft Dollars
The expression "soft dollars" refers to the practice of paying brokers
higher commissions than would otherwise be justified in exchange for
services such as research or a Bloomberg terminal. 93 This is not a breach
of the fund advisors' fiduciary duties, as section 28(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act protects advisors who pay higher commissions than would
otherwise be charged, as long as they determine "in good faith that such
amount of commission was reasonable in relation to the value of the
brokerage and research services provided."'' 94 Nonetheless, the practice is
troubling because it can overcharge clients for both commissions and
research or other services. The SEC estimates the cost of soft fees at
approximately $1 billion.' 95 This is the cost to the securities industry as a
whole, not just to hedge funds.
The movement towards unbundling requires brokers to break out the
cost of the trade versus other services provided. The SEC issued guidance
in June 2006 to recommend that buy side firms consolidate their trading
with brokers who offer the best execution and pay a separate commission
to third-party research providers. 196  A managing director from Credit
Suisse commented that "[u]nbundling seems to be the right thing to do as a
fiduciary at this point."'9' Fidelity, for one, has followed that advice and
now has separate agreements for trade execution and research.'98 A
concern with the unbundling approach is that it will exacerbate the decline
in quantity and quality of research, which appears to have been negatively
impacted by the Global Research Settlement. 99
F. Short Termism
On the whole, hedge funds are viewed as short term investors, which
can make them unpopular with companies and countries that want stable,
long term shareholders or investors. Companies often raise concerns with
193. See, e.g., SEC, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-
DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND MUTUAL FUNDS (1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/softdolr.htm. Soft dollars also typically include entertainment expenses that brokers
incur, such as taking fund managers out to professional sports games or expensive dinners,
to retain or gain their trading business.
194. Exchange Act § 28(e)(1), 15. U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1)(2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
195. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 731.
196. See Ivy Schmerken, Buy Side Seeks Unbundling; Finds New Ways to Manage Sell
Side Relationships, WALL ST. & TECH., Mar. 1, 2007 (explaining the buy side's struggle
with attaining adequate research from brokers and boutiques).
197. Id.
198. See O'Leary, supra note 187 (discussing Fidelity's approach to attaining research).
199. See id. (detailing other problems with acquiring quality research).
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activist hedge funds, because such funds focus on a short term rise in stock
prices and do not consider long term value creation.200 One study indicated
that hedge fund activism may help the target company's operating
performance in the long run, rather than hurt it; Brave et al., found that on
average target companies experienced a 7% increase in stock price during
the four weeks around the announcement that a hedge fund acquired a 5%
stake, that the stock kept pace with the market for the next year, and that
the stock's operating performance improved over the next two years. 0 '
While this data reflects the short term jump that hedge fund investors may
have been looking for, it also indicates that their activism does not appear
to have hurt the company.
On a national level, regulators worry that short term investors worsen
periods of reduced confidence when they quickly withdraw their money
without first considering whether the fundamentals of the market remain
sound. One of the primary drawbacks of heightened liquidity is that
financial inflows can become outflows just as quickly. The former Prime
Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, blamed "hedge funds, and in
particular George Soros, for destabilizing exchange rates and playing a
major role in causing the Asian financial crisis. ' 20 2 Although studies show
that funds made substantial withdrawals preceding and during the crisis,
Mohamad's criticism oversimplifies the problem because it ignores other
important events, such as the refusal of foreign banks to roll over short
term loans to Asian banks during the crisis. 20 3 While hedge funds were
only one factor in the Asian financial crisis, they are still seen as the source
of higher volatility in the Asian equity markets. 204 Funds are injecting
greater liquidity into these markets, as reflected by the fact that the trading
volume in Asian interest rate derivatives has tripled and the amount of
200. E.g., Richard Parsons, CEO of Time Warner, Address at the Mergers and
Acquisition class at Harvard Law School (Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with author) (opining that
Carl Icahn's public protest against the company's strategic plan was actually an effort to
create an event where he could benefit from event driven investing, and that Icahn was not
interested in building sustainable long term earnings).
201. See Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance (Sept. 22, 2006) http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyticallcfr/2006/oct
hedge-fund.pdf (explaining how hedge fund activism generates statistically significant
abnormal returns); see also Mark Hulbert, A Good Word for Hedge Fund Activism, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at C6 (arguing that hedge funds may not actually represent sound
investment opportunities).
202. ScoTr, supra note 3, at 745.
203. See id. (citing Eduardo R. Borensztein & R. Gaston Gelos, A Panic-Prone Pack?
The Behavior of Emerging Market Mutual Funds, (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
00/198, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wpOO198.pdf
(exploring the behavior of emerging market mutual funds)).
204. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Hedge Funds, the Usual Suspects, Blamed for
Volatility in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C9 (discussing the problems with investors
who blame hedge funds for the recent volatility in Asia).
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credit derivatives has doubled since last year, and heightened volatility is
likely part of the price, particularly when there is overall uncertainty with
205the market direction.
VI. REGULATORY REFORM EFFORTS
A general sense that investors need more access to information
regarding hedge funds drove the mandatory registration effort in the United
States and underlies many of the ongoing concerns with hedge funds both
in the United States and internationally. Below is an overview of
mandatory registration efforts, a description of the United States' more
recent regulatory approach, and a brief overview of the international
regulatory approach.
A. Movement Towards Hedge Fund Registration
In the United States, one of the most widely debated regulatory issues
has been whether the SEC may require hedge funds to register with the
Commission. The SEC became concerned that hedge funds were not being
scrutinized adequately as their growth picked up in the late 1990's and in
early 2000. Specifically, the SEC was concerned about fraud, conflicts of
interest, and the retailization of hedge funds through funds of funds.2 °6
Recent scandals that implicated hedge funds included late-trading and
market-timing schemes. Due to hedge funds' wide exemptions from
registration and other regulation, the SEC had limited data about the funds
and their impact on the market economy. The SEC's 2003 Staff Report
stated that it "has no reliable data on the number of hedge funds in
existence or the amount of hedge fund assets under management."20 7
These concerns led the SEC to issue new rules in October 2004, which
became effective in February 2006, that narrowed the definition of "client"
in Rule 203(b)(1-2) of the Investment Advisor Act (IAA) such that a look-
through could be used to count the actual number of clients and required
hedge funds to register with the agency. °8 As mentioned in Part III.D
above, investment vehicles with lockup periods of two years or longer were
specifically excluded from the registration requirements, which effectively
205. Id.
206. See Hellrung, supra note 75, at 334 (outlining SEC trepidation with the threat of
hedge fund retailization). Funds of funds are often open to smaller investors because they
have lower minimum purchases, raising concerns that smaller investors are not truly
sophisticated investors who can evaluate the risks involved. Id. at 331-33.
207. SEC 2003 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 n.2.
208. See Bevilacqua, supra note 64, at 268 (reviewing the requirement that all
investment advisors with a certain level of assets must register with the SEC).
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excluded most private equity and venture capital firms.20 9 Such lockups,
however, are largely unpopular with hedge fund investors, and so the
proposed rules required the vast majority of hedge funds to register.
Opposition to the proposed Rule 203(b) remained strong throughout
the subsequent comment period, with 73% of the letters that the SEC
received opposing registration.2 10 In part, the cost of compliance drove this
opposition, as many funds would need to hire a compliance officer to
provide the necessary information for Form ADV.21' Nonetheless, the rules
went into effect following the SEC's rare 3-2 split vote in February 2006,
indicating the breadth of the dissenting view. 12  Off-shore funds had to
register as well if they had more than fourteen U.S. investors, limiting the
funds' ability to escape regulation by moving offshore.1 3
The rule was subsequently overturned in Goldstein v. SEC, on the
grounds that the definition of "client" was irregularly construed to mean
different things in different parts of the IAA, making the rule arbitrary!
14
The court looked to Congress' intent in passing the IAA, as well as the
definition of "client" in other securities regulations, before deciding that the
SEC's revised interpretation of "client" in section 203 was inconsistent
both with the IAA and other securities regulations.215 Prior to the Goldstein
decision, 2,500 hedge funds had filed with the SEC as of February 2006.216
The SEC did not appeal that decision, and instead is focusing on protecting
investors by raising the net worth requirements for accredited investors
who invest in hedge funds. 2" Additionally, the President's Working Group
(PWG) on Financial Markets, which is chaired currently by Treasury
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, recently announced that it believes a
principles-based approach to self-regulation, rather than further federal
regulation such as a registration requirement, is the appropriate response to
recent hedge fund growth.218
209. Hellrung, supra note 75, at 337.
210. Liffmann, supra note 55, at 2148.
211. Verret, supra note 8, at 807.
212. Id.; Paredes, supra note 167, at 976.
213. Preiserowicz, supra note 6, at 842.
214. 451 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
215. Id. at 879.
216. Jaye Scholl, With the Threat of Increased Regulation Lessened, One SEC
Commissioner Has Come up with a Unique Approach to Entice Hedge Funds to Register,
ALPHA MAGAZINE, Jan. 22, 2007, available at http://www.iimagazine.com/
article.aspx?articlelD=1 119716.
217. Stephen Labaton, Officials Reject More Oversight of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2007, at Al.
218. Press Release, Department of Treasury, Common Approach to Private Pools of
Capital; Guidance on Hedge Fund Issues Focuses on Systemic Risk, Investor Protection,
(Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm (last visited Apr. 5,
2008).
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B. Current Regulatory Approach in the United States
Although Congress could mandate hedge fund registration
legislatively, such legislation appears politically unlikely at this time.2" 9
This lack of political will probably was one of the reasons behind the
SEC's decision to not appeal Goldstein.120 Additionally, SEC Chairman
William H. Donaldson, who was one of the driving forces behind the
Hedge Fund Registration Rule, has since been replaced as chairman by
Christopher Cox, who prefers a consensus approach to regulation and is
unlikely to push through a 3-2 vote at the SEC.22'
The PWG on Capital Markets issued a report in February 2007 that
focused primarily on self-regulation through market discipline, and on
using regulatory policies to limit direct investment in private pools of
capital to sophisticated individuals instead of pursuing a mandatory
registration approach. 222  The PWG identified the avoidance of systemic
risk and investor protection as two of its central goals, and put forth
principles directed at four groups of industry participants: regulators and
supervisors, counterparties and creditors, private pools of capital, and pool
investors and fiduciaries. 223 The EU quickly applauded the PWG's "light
touch" approach, and the EU Internal Markets Commissioner commented
that he believed "the current regulatory structure is working well" and that
a "well-developed set of checks and balances" are in place.224
Nevertheless, not all share this view: Connecticut's Attorney General
voiced concerns that the PWG's principles-based approach is "vague" and
"unenforce-able. 225  Although a bright line rule would be simpler to
enforce, the PWG's suggested approach makes more sense than the rules-
based approach that the SEC previously pursued given the complexity of
issues such as leverage and retail investor access and the ease with which
financial instruments can now be structured to largely evade bright line
rules.
219. Senator Grassley has been attempting to introduce an amendment to the Investment
Advisors Act to redefine "client" in line with the SEC's original rule, but thus far he has
received little support. Liz Moyer, Grassley Goes After Hedge Funds (Again) (May 15,
2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/05/15/hedge-fund-sec-biz-wall-cx-Im_0516grassley
.html.
220. Elizabeth Wine, Self-Regulation of Hedge Funds Endorsed, ON WALL STREET, Apr.
1, 2007, at 24.
221. Kara Scannell, The SEC's Mr. Consensus, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at Cl.
222. The President's Working Group on Capital Markets, Agreement Among PWG and
U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital,
(Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hp272-principles.pdf.
223. Steel Remarks, supra note 9.
224. Anuj Gangahar & Jeremy Grant, Brussels Support for 'Light Touch' Regime, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, at 21.
225. Id.
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C. International Regulatory Approach
The principles-based approach that U.S. regulatory authorities most
recently presented is intentionally similar to the regulatory approach taken
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the U.K., reflecting a desire to
maintain similar regulatory philosophies and to avoid regulatory forum
shopping.226 The U.K. is actually moving towards voluntary self-regulation
by hedge funds, which may foretell a similar move for the United States, as
the Chairman of the PWG mentioned that "[t]he U.S. Treasury has two
advisory groups examining the issue and has been in frequent contact with
representatives of the U.K. group throughout their efforts. 227  Concern
with the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and a desire to avoid
forum shopping for more lenient regulatory environments are reasons to
closely consider other countries' approaches to the same issues that the
SEC currently faces. A recent report on the U.S. capital markets raised
significant concerns with the competitiveness of the market looking
forward, which it based in part on the regulatory environment. 228 These
concerns particularly apply to hedge funds, which have no physical need to
be based in any one country. The SEC can reach funds that allow U.S.
investors, but these investors could lose out in the long run if, at an
extreme, funds closed themselves off to U.S. investors to avoid SEC
regulation.
Many countries share concerns similar to those of U.S. regulators.
Canadian authorities proposed mandatory registration for hedge funds
within that country in February 2007, although no final decision has been
made.229 Central bankers and finance ministers from the G7 countries are
calling for greater disclosures "of strategies and the amount of risk being
taken., 230 Their main concern is that investors and counterparties need
"accurate and relevant information" for "market discipline to work
effectively., 231 At the urging of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the G8
placed hedge funds prominently on their agenda in 2007, where
participants recognized that hedge funds have "contributed significantly to
the efficiency of the financial system," but called for "the need to be
vigilant ... [g]iven the strong growth of the hedge fund industry and the
226. Steel Remarks, supra note 9.
227. Bryan-Low, supra note 165.
228. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I 1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
229. E.g., Carrie Johnson, Call for More Oversight of Hedge Funds is Rejected, WASH.
POST, Feb. 23, 2007, at Dl (describing the Canadian proposal).
230. Andrew Sorkin, G7 Report is Said to Call for More Hedge Fund Disclosure, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr. 20, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/20/g7-report-
is-said-to-call-for-more-hedge-fund-disclosure.
231. Id.
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increasing complexity of the instruments they trade .... The leaders of
the G8 agreed to adopt the recommendations from the Financial Stability
Forum's Report on Highly Leveraged Institutions and to continue to study
the issue.233
One of the unique problems regulators face in Muslim countries is the
challenge of developing derivative contracts that are Shariah-compliant.234
The Shariah, which is the foundation of Islamic law, forbids variable
interest rate payments, a key component of the Black-Scholes option
pricing model.2 35  Due to this prohibition, the Saudi Arabian stock
exchange, known as the Tadawul, currently does not allow short selling.
236
Nevertheless, it is likely that Muslim financial institutions will develop a
way to structure financial products that will both be Shariah-compliant and
allow the use of derivatives within the next few years. Islamic financial
institutions have found alternate structures for other instruments that
typically use a variable interest rate, such as mortgages, so this possibility
does not seem farfetched.237
Internationally, the most common shared concern is with systemic risk
rather than individual investor protection. Countries take different
approaches to the level of paternalism that is appropriate in securities
regulation. As mentioned above, the approach to retail investors vis-A-vis
hedge funds varies widely internationally, ranging from free access in
Hong Kong, to access with greater protective measures in Germany, to
restricted access in the United States. Systemic risk and fears that the
international nature of finance today could lead quickly to the contagion of
multiple capital markets if one were to be affected by a fund collapse,
explain why G8 countries have placed hedge funds prominently on their
annual agenda. While Amaranth's failure did not create systemic
contagion, the failure of a larger fund or of a series of funds could push
regulators towards tighter regulation. The German Finance Minister
232. G8 SUMMIT DECLARATION, GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
3 (2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/g8/2007/g8agenda.pdf.
233. Id.
234. Interest payments are considered usury (riba) under Islamic law and are thus
forbidden. See, e.g., Muslim-Investor.com, Prohibited Business Activity, http://muslim-
investor.com/mi/prohibited.phtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (describing various prohibitions
under Islamic law).
235. See, e.g., Simon Benninga & Zvi Wiener, Binomial Option Pricing, the Black-
Scholes Option Pricing Formula, and Exotic Options, 6 MATHEMATICA IN EDUC. & RES. 1
(1997), http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-benninga/mma/MiER64.pdf (discussing the use
of the Black-Scholes model to price options).
236. Jia Lynn Yang, Saudi Arabia's Stock Collapse, FORTUNE, Dec. 11, 2006, at 32.
237. See, e.g., Assif Shameen, Islamic Banks: A Novelty No Longer, BUSINESS WEEK,
Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_32/
b3946141_mz035.htm (chronicling various efforts by financial institutions to comply with
Islamic law).
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recently warned that "the repetition of a big crisis like Long Term Capital
Management could provoke the outright regulation that funds want to
avoid."
238
VII. SUMMARY
Overall, the PWG's approach to principles-based regulation of hedge
funds appears to be a practical move. Hedge fund regulation is a sensitive
matter, for hedge fund growth has fueled both growth and liquidity in the
securities markets while simultaneously increasing the potential for
systemic risk. Although this paper discusses a potential approach to each
of the issues raised above, the following is a brief review of recommended
regulatory measures.
For many of the relevant issues, and leverage in particular, market
discipline should be sufficient to keep hedge funds in line. As mentioned,
the combination of improved counterparty risk measures, increased
investor awareness of risk following widely covered losses at funds such as
LTCM and Amaranth, and increased litigation risk for investment
consultants, should discourage funds from taking on too much leverage. At
the same time, the SEC should ensure that hedge funds, especially funds of
funds, fully disclose the extent of their leverage and the risk entailed to
potential investors.
Legitimate concerns remain with retail investors' increasing
participation in hedge funds, given that such investors may be less
financially sophisticated than the average hedge fund investor in the past.
Currently, the anti-fraud rules of the various securities acts protect retail
investors, and vigorous enforcement should help limit cases of actual fraud
or material misrepresentation. A broader question remains, however, about
the sufficiency of hedge fund disclosure to potential investors, particularly
in regards to the potential risk involved. Current regulations, such as
section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, do not directly address this, because
non-equity holdings do not need to be disclosed and simply knowing a
fund's holdings will not necessarily help an individual investor assess the
risk involved. The SEC's current move to tighten the accredited investor
standard is in line with its mandate to protect investors, but increasingly at
odds with the international approach, and the reality of increasing indirect
access to hedge funds through funds of funds and the initial public
offerings of managers such as Fortress.
From the fund managers' point of view, investment disclosure is the
largest area of concern, particularly given the type of copycat followership
238. Carter Dougherty, Economic Powers to Study Growing Influence of Hedge Funds,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2007, at A21.
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Berkshire Hathaway experienced. In regards to the portfolio disclosures
required by section 13(f), increasing the issuance of confidentiality
requests, even for relatively brief time periods, should help alleviate
manager concerns. In addition, the SEC should give greater thought to the
distinction it draws between activist and non-activist funds based on the
differing regulatory concerns raised.
Morphable ownership is a concern to the extent that other market
participants are not aware of the lack of economic ownership, and the
possibly divergent incentives that may result. The SEC should ensure that
funds disclose their economic ownership position as well as their voting
control in Form 13D filings. Beyond that, the possibility of vote buying
through the use of derivatives is open to anyone and should not be of
particular concern. This is particularly true as the restrictions under section
16 of the Exchange Act mean that virtually no fund will acquire greater
than a 9.9% stake in a company, and as such its voting-morphable or
otherwise-is unlikely to be determinative.
The current regulatory structure adequately addresses short selling and
soft dollars. The SEC should prosecute actual market manipulation, but
should be wary of defensive executives who use lawsuits to attempt to prop
up their stock, as appears to be the case with Overstock.com. Empirical
evidence currently does not support other issues, such as the criticism of
hedge funds as harmful short term investors. If countries such as Malaysia
have specific concerns with currency outflows, they may chose to impose
capital controls, as Malaysia did in the Asian financial crisis, but they will
likely have to pay the price of reduced liquidity and foreign investment in
the long term.
Overall, the current antifraud securities regulations, combined with
market forces exerted by counterparties, investors, and investment
consultants, appear largely sufficient to serve the purpose of investor
protection. Systemic risk remains somewhat of an unknown risk, but
Amaranth's recent $6.5 billion loss suggests that the international financial
system can absorb significant losses without triggering the collapse of other
players. Increased international coordination by securities regulators and
government leaders, such as efforts at the G8 summit, should help lead to
internationally consistent regulation and reduce funds' ability to escape
existing regulation through regulatory forum shopping. In turn, this
coherence should further diminish the likelihood of a possible systemic
collapse due to hedge fund losses.
A principles-based approach will facilitate international cooperation
by ensuring that regulators are focused on the same overarching issues
rather than just the technical application of national rules. The application
of national rules can lead to a patchwork of regulations internationally,
while shared principles are more likely to lead to a congruent approach.
878 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:4
Bright line rules can also be easier to evade given the flexibility of financial
instruments today, leading to behavior that is superficially within the letter
of the law but violates the spirit of it. Neither rules nor principle-based
regulations will prevent outright fraud, and neither is mutually exclusive,
but a focus on principles will improve the coherence of international
regulation while still allowing flexibility to take into account the different
structures and strategies of hedge funds and other pooled investment
vehicles.
